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III
RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR THE CARRIAGE OF MAIL

At least in the first years after the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the most important provision was Section
406 (b) which stated that in fixing rates of compensation for the
carriage of air mail, the Board should consider the need of each
air carrier for mail compensation "sufficient ... together with all
other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under
honest, economical, and efficient management to maintain and
continue the development of air transportation to the extent and
of the character and quality required for the commerce of the
United States, the Postal Service and the national defense."
Previously, air carriers, after more or less competitive bidding, had entered into contracts with the Post Office Department
to carry air mail. The contracts were subject to revision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The Civil Aeronautics Act
abolished this system of awarding air mail contracts 00 Section
406 (a) of the act empowered and directed the Civil Aeronautics
Board to "fix and determine from time to time, after notice and
hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the
transportation of mail by aircraft, the facilities used and useful
therefor and the services connected therewith." Section 406 (b)
established standards which the Board must consider in fixing
such rates. These standards are:
(1) the increased costs which may result from the fact that
the carrier must provide necessary and adequate facilities and
services for the transportation of mail;
t Part I of this article appeared at pages 1-22 of this volume.
* Attorneys, General Counsel's Office, Civil Aeronautics Board.
100. The mail rate provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 were
the culmination of a long series of congressional enactments dealing with
airmail compensation. [Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 805; Watres Act of
1930, 46 Stat. 1; Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933, 39 U.S.C.A. § 469f (1934)].
ir Mail Act of 1934, the immediate predecessor of the Civil
Under the
Aeronautics Act, the carriage of mail was put on a three year contractual
basis with the original contract rates determined by competitive bidding.
In 1935 the act was amended and the Interstate Commerce Commission was
directed to review the rates and adjust them upon a reasonable basis within

certain statutory limits.
[378]
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(2) standards prescribed by law respecting the character
and quality of service to be rendered by air carriers;
(3) the need for compensation sufficient to insure the performance of the mail service;
(4) the need for compensation for the transportation of mail
sufficient together with all other revenue of the carrier to enable it under honest, economical and efficient management to
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to
the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the postal service, and the national
defense.
The first three standards do not differ fundamentally from
those prevailing in the fixing of rates for the transportation of
persons or property or for ordinary public utility services. It is
the fourth standard which is unique and by which the United
States Government, through the device of air mail payments
assumed the responsibility for the proper development of American air transportation. "The 'compensation' which the carrier receives thus becomes compensation not only for carrying the mail
but for the building up of a system of air transportation which
will serve the nation's commerce and security as well."'' 1
The use of air mail payments to develop air transportation
has substantially contributed to the conversion of an industry
that on the whole was chaotic and bankrupt to a well-financed,
well-balanced air transportation system. Prior to 1938, "half of
the private capital which had been invested in the industry had
been irretrievably lost. The result of shaken faith on the part of
the investing public in the financial stability of the airlines was
preventing the flow of greatly needed funds into this industry.
More than half of the domestic airlines carrying mail disclosed
operating deficits for the year ending June 30, 1938. '' 102 Domestic
airlines as a whole had an annual net operating loss of $1,707,670
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938. For the fiscal year enting December 31, 1945, this loss had been converted to a net
operating profit of $33,980,336. From June 30, 1938 to December
31, 1945, total miles flown increased 308 per cent, and the number
of passengers increased almost 614 per cent. The mail pound
101. American Air Lines-Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 323, 335 (March 12, 1942).
102. First Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board (1939).
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miles carried increased over eight-fold and express pound miles
carried more than eleven-fold.
A large part of this growth was, of course, due to the expansion of all industrial activity and the tremendous importance
of air transportation during the war.10 3 An even larger part was

due to the fact that most airlines which had survived the early
Thirties had managements of competence and vision appropriate
to a new and vigorous industry. But there can be no doubt that
the planned development resulting from the provisions of Section 406 enabled the industry to meet the demands made upon it
10
and to finance an unprecedented expansion.

4

The administration of Section 406 placed upon the Board
responsibilities far beyond those assumed by the ordinary utility
rate-making body. For this was not just a device for payment
for services rendered but the most effective tool by which the
Board was to develop a sound air transportation system. Nothing
is more apparent in the early Board cases than its refusal to be
bound by the narrow considerations of traditional utility rate
fixing. In its first airmail rate case, the Mid-Continent Airmail
Rate proceeding,'1 5 the Board stated as follows:
"The above factors which the Authority [Board] is directed
to take into consideration in fixing and determining fair and
reasonable rates under the act, differ from the tests which,
under the influence of judicial decision during the past 40
years, have been set up for the guidance of public regulatory
bodies 6 in fixing rates for public utilities and common carriers.

0

The early rate policy of the Board was directed primarily towards enabling the air transportation industry to attain commercial self sufficiency at the earliest possible time. The mail rate
provisions were not interpreted as bestowing upon the Board the
103. This was to some degree offset by the fact that after Pearl Harbor
a large part of the airline fleet was transferred to the armed forces and airline operations were conducted with an unbelievably small number of planes.
104. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act the amount paid air carriers is not
correlated in any way with airmail postage rates. While the industry has
been subsidized in the sense that the airlines have been paid in excess of a
compensatory charge measured by the cost of the service rendered in carrying the mail, domestic postal airmail revenues from 1938 through 1944 exceeded payments to domestic air carriers by $103,263,320, and the total expense of handling, carrying and delivering domestic air mail by $13,669,336.
(See U.S. Post Office Cost Ascertainment Report).
105. 1 C.A.A 45 (April 14, 1939).
106. Id. at 54, 55.
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role of a benevolent Santa Claus heedlessly distributing bonanzas
to a deserving industry. Instead the emphasis in the early cases
was on using airmail compensation as a device to develop efficient
and economical management which through expansion of nonmail revenues could develop soundly financed air carriers relying
upon a paying public acceptance of air transportation of passengers and property rather than on government payments.
In its First Annual Report, the Board summarized its policy
as follows:
"This administration of the Act necessarily involves a
policy of rate determination which serves to recognize managerial efficiency and to permit benefits therefrom to redound
to the carriers, thus providing an incentive to management
for further development while at the same time discouraging inefficient management by refusing, in fixing airmail
rates, to allow any of the costs incident thereto. Accordingly,
the Authority has analyzed both past and forecast operating
revenues and expenses of the air carrier in each proceeding in
the light of the statutory test of 'honest, economical, and
efficient management,' not for the purpose of invading proper managerial discretion but with the object of encouraging
a progressive, efficient management which will be characterized by a constant effort to increase commercial revenues,
thereby resulting in the attainment of an increasing measure
''10 7
of commercial self-sufficiency.
In the early cases, enough airmail compensation was given
so that the carrier could break even and a little more if its expenses were reasonable. In order to make a more substantial
profit, the air carrier had to build up its passenger and property
revenues. This policy was designed to encourage development
and efficiency on the part of the carriers. The emphasis on efficient management in the early mail rate cases led to a critical
examination of every item of expense that would be considered
in determining the need. In such cases as Inland Air Lines-Mail
Rates,108 United Air Lines-Mail Rates'0 9 and T.W.A.-Mail Rates"
literally every expense was closely scrutinized.
107. Op. cit. supra note 102, at 21.
108. 1 C.. A. 155 (June 7, 1939).
109. 1 C.A.A. 752 (June 22, 1940).
110. 2 C.A.B. 226 (September 19, 1940). Under the Reorganization Act of
1939, the "Authority" was changed to the Board and the economic and safety
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Gradually the Board began to consider the return on investment in fixing airmail rates. As early as United Air Lines-Mail
Rates,"' the investment in property used and usable in transporting mail was analyzed, but no return on this investment was
computed in order to fix the airmail rate. In the first Braniff
Airways-Mail Rate proceeding, 112 the Board declared that the rate
fixed would provide an ample return on investment. It is clear,
however, that return on investment was not computed in order
to fix the rate but merely to justify a rate computed by other
techniques. In Northwest Airlines-Mail Rates"3 and in Chicago
& Southern Air Lines-Mail Rates"4 investment was computed
not so much that a return on it could be allowed, but to measure
the efficiency of management by relating the investment to
the volume of service. Beginning with Delta Air CorporationMail Rates,-' the Board adopted the more standard utility procedure and in each case thereafter computed the return on investment.
The allowance of a fair return on investment, however, was
not employed as in the traditional utility rate case to determine
the constitutional minimum which must be paid the utility. Instead it was used as an additional device to encourage efficient
operation. Air carriers which the Board deemed to be more
efficient were allowed a greater return on investment than the
less efficient carriers. Thus while American Airlines was allowed
a 9.5 per cent return," 6 Colonial was allowed only 5.7 per cent.
In Colonial Air-Mail Rates," 7 the Board stated:
"While Colonial's return is less than we have approved in
several other rate proceedings, we do not believe that it is too
low in view of the high operating expenses of 105.56 cents per
revenue mile recorded by Colonial for the 2 years ended June
30, 1942, as compared to the costs of all domestic carriers
which averaged 66.84 cents per revenue mile, and as compared
to the costs of DC-3 operators, which ranged from 55.92 to
regulation functions were put under the Board. The administrative functions
of the Civil Aeronautics Act were continued in a separate agency-the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
111. 1 C.A.A. 752 (June 22, 1940).
112. 2 C.A.B. 555, 565 (April 8, 1941).
113. 2 C.A.B. 827 (August 1, 1941).
114. 3 C.A.B. 161 (November 14, 1941).
115. 3 C.A.B. 261 (January 29, 1942).
116. American Airlines-Mail Rates, 3 .C.A.B. 323 (March 12, 1942).
117. Colonial Airlines-Mail Rates, 4 C.A.B. 71, 78 (December 29, 1942).
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72.79 cents per revenue mile. It is recognized that the comparison of costs per mile of one carrier to similar costs of other
carriers is subject to criticism and that because no two carriers operate under identical circumstances, comparative costs
do not afford an accurate yardstick for determining the
reasonableness of costs. It is further recognized that Colonial
conducts operations into a foreign country over a relatively
short route which results in somewhat higher operating costs
per mile. However, where the costs of a carrier are so far in
excess of the average costs of the industry as a whole and of
the highest costs recorded by any operator of similar equipment, it is reasonable to question the economy and efficiency
of management."
The use of the rate of return on investment as a technique to
encourage efficient operations and to reward the development of
commercial services was abandoned during the war. With severe
limitations on the number of planes, war time use of the airlines
as a vital part of our national and international transportation
system required that the development of purely commercial
traffic be discouraged rather than encouraged. For the duration
of the war the rate of return for domestic carriers was standardized at eight per cent for domestic carriers118 and ten per cent for
international carriers." 9 In announcing the reversal of policy in
20
Pan-American-GraceMail Rates, the Board stated: 1
"In our decisions in previous rate cases We have dwelled
repeatedly and at length upon the importance of giving carriers an incentive to increase the degree of commercial selfsufficiency of their enterprises, and to reduce the extent of
their financial dependence upon compensation from the Government....
"Now, however, we are at war. The type and volume of
service that a carrier renders is not now determined by commercial considerations, but by the national need in a time of
emergency. Services attractive to commercial traffic may have
to be scaled down, or abandoned entirely. National policy may
require the opening of new routes, or the increase of schedules
where ordinary commercial inducements are meager. ...
118. Northeast Airlines-Mail Rates Route No. 27, 4 C.A.B. 181 (March
18, 1943).
119. Pan American-Grace Airways-Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B3. 550 (1942).
120. Id. at 589.
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"Under these conditions we conclude that during the war,
and solely because of the conditions that war creates, the rate
of return upon investment, which has heretofore been only
one of a number of elements taken into account in determining the net operating income that it has seemed reasonable to
anticipate in the setting of a mail rate for the individual carriers, should now become the primary and controlling element
in that determination."
Soon after the end of the war, however, the Board in ordering Northeast Airlines to show cause why a tentative rate which
allowed only a 5.23 per cent return should not be made final, gave
a clear indication that rate of return would again be used as an
21
incentive device. The Board stated: 1

"Now that we are well along in the transitional period it
once more becomes necessary to stress the importance of providing an incentive for the development of traffic and for efficiency and economy of operation. It becomes desirable to
reduce the amount of subsidy to a minimum in those instances
where high costs result from uneconomical or inefficient management. We cannot but feel that to provide the same rate of
return for all carriers regardless of the efficiency and economy
of management as reflected by their comparative costs after
reasonable allowance for differences in the circumstances and
conditions inherent in their operations, would be to stifle initiative and reduce to a minimum the incentive for low cost
performance."
The most complete statement of the Board's philosophy of
mail rate making under the fourth consideration of section 40622
is found in the first American Airlines-Mail Rate Proceeding
in which the Board declared:
"In determining, in the present case, the fair and reasonable rate for the transportation of mail and for the fulfillment
of those other purposes contemplated by section 2 of the Act,
we are not only confronted with the task of determining a
compensatory rate within the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution; we are faced with
the duty of fixing a fair and reasonable rate under an Act of
Congress. The basic distinction between the two functions,
121. Docket Nos. 1932 and 1890. Show Cause Order dated April 1, 1946.
122. 3 C.A.B. 323 (March 12, 1942).
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which is of signal importance to the present task, has been
clearly stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the following language of an impressive dissent:
"'The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an
opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting
the business. Cost includes not only operating expenses,
but capital charges. Capital charges cover the allowance,
by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the
nature of the security issued therefor; the allowance for
risk incurred, and enough more to attract capital. The
reasonable rate to be prescribed by a commission may allow an efficiently managed utility much more.'
"Between the barely compensatory rate required by the
Constitution and the fair and reasonable rate contemplated
by a legislative enactment there exists a marginal field in
which administrative discretion may operate to provide an incentive to enterprising management and a stimulus to pioneering initiative which are so essential to the development of
the air carrier industry."
"The 'compensation' to be paid to the carlier in the airmail
rate is not merely compensation for the transportation of the
mail. The use of the mail payments is a statutory device for
the accomplishment of national objectives that transcend the
interests of the postal service. Those objectives, expressly
stated in the Act, encompass the maintenance and continued
'development of air transportation to the extent and of the
character required for the commerce of the United States, the

Postal Service and the national defense.'

)Y123

Basically, the policy of this case has been followed until the
present time. The Board wisely realized that rate determination
is primarily a matter of informed judgment and not a mechanical
application of statistical computations. In the regulation of a new
and growing industry under a statutory mandate to promote its
development, the Board has not used traditional rate making
techniques to determine minimum payments but has only used
those techniques when they fostered the broader objectives of
promoting an efficient self sufficient air transportation industry.
123. Id. at 333, quoting from Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 290, 45 S.Ct. 544, 67 L.Ed. 1205 (1923).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

Moreover, the Board has refused to become ensnared by
fictitious calculations of "reproduction cost" in order to compute
a "fair return on fair value." In the rehearing of the American
Airlines case,12 4 the carrier presented evidence of reproduction
cost as a measure of "present value." The Board in no uncertain
words indicated that it would refuse to consider such evidence.
The Board stated on this point:
"The presentation at the rehearing of the reproduction
costs of the carrier's property devoted to transportation service
as of December 31, 1941, brings us to the question of the proper
use, if any, to be made of such evidence. This Board in exercising its ratemaking functions has never and does not now
measure the reasonableness of the rate in terms, of a fair
return upon the so-called 'fair value' of the property used
and useful in the public service. One of the primary factors, which is frequently controlling, in determining the
fair value of such property is its reproduction cost less depreciation. We believe that experience has proved such method
to be administratively and economically unsound; its application to public regulated enterprise during the past four decades has placed upon State and Federal regulatory agencies a
We beburdensome, complex, expensive and futile task ....
lieve that the ascertainment of the capital cost of producing
the air transportation service requires that the rate of return
should be predicated upon the funds which have been actually
and legitimately invested in the transportation enterprise
rather than upon any valuation of the carrier's property, and
we shall continue to adhere to this method in the future as we
have in the past. We accordingly regard reproduction cost
evidence as irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of a fair
and reasonable rate and evidence of this type in the future
the
will not be admitted to the record in rate proceedings for
1 5
purpose of showing the value of the carrier'sproperty.""
In 1942 it became apparent that the objective of the Board's
policy was being achieved by certain carriers which were attaining a degree of commercial self-sufficiency. Since that time, the
Board has been fixing rates for two general categories of carriers.
The "need" class carriers were those which had not yet attained
commercial self-sufficiency. The Board in determining a "need"
124. 3 C.A.B. 770 (November 12, 1942).
125. Id. at 788-789. Italics suppli'd.
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carrier's mail pay must consider its overall need for revenue
sufficient to develop it in accordance with the policy of the act.
The considerations and techniques employed in determining this
overall need are those discussed in detail supra. The "self-sufficient" carriers constitute the second category. These carriers had
developed their passenger and property revenues to such an extent that they no longer required any subsidy., Since they already
received enough income from their commercial revenues to enable them to develop properly, the Board was no longer primarily
concerned with their overall "need." In fixing fair and reasonable rates for "self-sufficient" carriers the importance of the
fourth or developmental consideration of Section 406 is dimmed
and the first three considerations become important. These require that the Board consider the increased costs resulting from
service and facilities requirements imposed upon a carrier by
reason of its carriage of mail under its certificate, the increased
costs because of the imposition of such standards respecting
service as may be prescribed by law, and the need for compensation sufficient to insure the performance of the service.
These requirements are closely akin to those which are considered by a public utility commission in fixing common carrier
rates. The Board is no longer primarily concerned with total
investment, revenues, and expenses which must be analyzed to
determine overall "need." Instead, its attention is focused on
the investment and costs allocable to the mail service and its
main effort is to pay a reasonable amount for the performance of
that service.
With the Eastern Air Lines-Mail Rates126 proceeding a rate
of 0.3 mills per pound mile was adopted as a service rate for
domestic air mail carriage. In this and two other leading cases,
American Airlines-Mail Rates127 and Pennsylvania-Central Airlines-Mail Rates,"8 the Board announced the principles which
would govern it in determining the service rate. In the leading
Eastern Air Lines case, that procedure was outlined as follows:
"Under the circumstances just outlined, it is essential that, as
a starting point, we determine a minimum mail rate under
which it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Government is taking respondent's property without due process of
126. 3 C.A.B. 733 (October 19, 1942).
127. 4 C.A.B. 90 (January 8, 1943).
128. 4 C.A.B. 22 (December 16, 1942).
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law; for under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 the respondent is required by section 405 (g) thereof to carry mail where
it is authorized to do so; and under section 406 of the Act it
is entitled to fair and reasonable rates for such service and for
related services mentioned in that section. This necessarily
means that there is such a minimum rate for these services
separately considered (i.e. apart from passenger and property
transportation services) which must be determined by the
Board. It is obvious that in order to reach such a determination we must exercise our judgment as to the proper amount
of investment and operating costs properly allocable to the
mail service, keeping in mind, however, that such allocated
cost is but one of the considerations upon which a judgment
may be formed as to the fair and reasonable rates."
The Board after confessing the weakness of any allocation formula, finally allocated the investment and cost between commercial and mail services on the basis of "the ratio existing between
the pound-miles of mail services and the pound-miles of commercial services after first charging to the commercial services
those expenses attributable to that service alone." The Board
continued:
".... it is important to bear in mind that the fundamental objective of the Congress as set forth in the declared policy in
the Act is the encouragement and development of an air transportation system . . . This broad policy objective must be
borne in mind not only when determining the mail rate for a
carrier which requires mail compensation in order to "break
even" in its financial operations, but also in determining the
mail rate for any carrier."
Even when fixing a service rate the Board did not fix the constitutional minimum which must be paid for the service rendered,
but the policy of the Civil Aeronautics Act to develop air transportation was considered. The rate was also fixed in the light
of special services accorded the air transportation of mail, and
the prevailing passenger and express fares.
By June 30, 1944, eleven domestic air carriers flying ninetyone per cent of the total revenue miles flown by domestic carriers
were being paid the service rate of 0.3 mill per pound mile or
sixty cents per ton mile. Only seven domestic air carriers flying
only about nine per cent of the domestic revenue-miles flown

19471
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were being paid a "need" or subsidy rate. All international carriers, however, were still being paid on a subsidy basis.
The 0.3 mill per pound mile rate had been fixed during late
1942 or early 1943 when the effect of the war on the operating
profits of the air carriers was uncertain and it contained judgment allowances for this uncertainty. During 1943 and 1944
domestic air carriers carried the heaviest loads and earned the
highest profits in their history. On December 22, 1944, the Board
ordered American Airlines, 129 Eastern Airlines,'3 Transcontinental and Western Airlines,' 3 ' and United Airlines'8 2 to show cause
why the 0.3 mill per pound mile (or 60 cents per ton mile) mail
rate should not be reduced to 32 cents per ton mile. In explaining this cut of almost fifty per cent in the service rate the Board
in almost identical show cause orders stated: 33
"In the previous case (the 0.3 mill per pound mile rate case)
we had available only a limited amount of experience under
the curtailed service pattern and there was considerable uncertainty as to whether the heavy loads then being carried
would continue and as to the effect of Army contract operations on the operating expenses. Consequently the rate fixed
in the case contained a large margin above the allocated cost
of the mail service. In view of the extended experience which
continues to show heavy loads [and] sustained high profits
... it appears that an adjustment of the mail rate is in
order. ..."
Before the cases could be tried the European war ended. The
Board felt that the end of the war substantially changed the
operating picture for these airlines and amended the show cause
order raising the proposed rate from thirty-two cents to fortyfive cents per ton mile. In explaining the need for amendment
4
the Board stated:1
"The period of transition for the industry is not only imminent
129. Docket No. 1698.
130. Docket No. 1697.
131. Docket No. 1700.
132. Docket No. 1699.
133. The quotation is from page 12 of show cause order in the American
Airlines case (Docket No. 1698) but Identical language appears In all four
show cause orders listed supra issued in the big four cases.
134. The quotation is from pages 2 and 8 of the amended show cause
order in the American Airlines case (Docket No. 1698) but identical language
appears in all of amended show cause orders.
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but is actually under way. It now appears probable that the
mail rate fixed in the proceeding will apply primarily to the
transitional rather than the war period. It seems appropriate,
therefore, that our previous findings be reviewed and our
order amended to reflect the costs, the loads, the operating
conditions, the equipment situation, and the expansion of
service contemplated during the transitional and early postwar period..

"It is our purpose to fix a service mail rate which will be high
enough to provide reasonable security against the risks inherent in the dynamic and unchartered transitional period ahead
and which, at the same time will be low enough to provide a
strong competitive incentive for economical and efficient management. ..

The Board then pointed out the overall similarity of costs and
operating patterns of the four air carriers and tentatively fixed
a uniform -service rate. The rate was placed substantially above
the allocated cost of mail service to protect against anticipated
declines in traffic loads before new economies could be realized
resulting from expanded mileage and frequencies and from new
and improved types of equipment. The new rate was accepted by
the carriers. Since these four carriers carried eighty-six per cent
of the mail carried by all domestic carriers, a saving of almost six
million dollars in mail pay was realized. Shortly prior to the issuance of the final opinions in these. cases American Airlines reduced its passenger rates so that they yielded roughly the fortyfive cents per ton mile paid for mail. These reductions were
generally followed by the other carriers. Thus the service mail
rate for air mail for the Big Four carriers is now relatively consistent with passenger rates.
The end of the war brought further changes in airmail rate
making technique. On the domestic side the Board issued a series
of regional route opinions in which new carriers were granted
certificates of convenience and necessity to operate so called
"feeder" lines serving smaller communities and tying into the
trunk lIne services of the larger carriers. 3 5 On the international
135. Texas Case, Docket No. 401-b-2 (November 5, 1943); Rocky Mountain
case, Docket No. 452 (March 28, 1946); Florida case, Docket No. 489 (March
28, 1946); West Coast case, Docket No. 250 (May 22, 1946Y; New England case,
Docket No. 399 (June 13, 1946).
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side the Board certificated new carriers across the North Atlantic,'13 South Atlantic, 13 7 Pacific13

and into South America.1 9

In both situations the Board was faced with the problem of providing mail compensation where there was not sufficient operating
experience to warrant a judgment as to the amount of the payment. The Board adopted the practice in these cases of fixing a
temporary rate until "adequate experience and operating data
have been accumulated to provide a sound and reliable basis for
the determination of a fair and reasonable rate." 1 0 In the Essair
Mail Rate Proceeding, 141-the Board outlined its reasons for the
use of a temporary rate device for feeder carriers stating:
"We have heretofore refused to establish future mail rates
on a tentative basis subject to later readjustment. We have
held that the adoption of a method of mail rate determination
patterned upon a "cost plus" system would tend to destroy
a carrier's incentive to maintain costs at a reasonable level and
to develop its non-mail business. In the present instance, however, petitioner is presently receiving no mail compensation
whatsoever for mail service rendered and it can receive no
mail compensation until the Board takes appropriate action.
Where, as is the case here, the circumstances surrounding the
operations of a particular carrier require that it receive mail
payments on a recently-certificated service we believe that we
are justified in fixing a temporary rate as a means of establishing a basis for mail payments for the new service and subsequently to proceed to fix and determine a final mail rate as
promptly as adequate data concerning the new operations are
available."
On July 15, 1946 the Board using basically the same reasoning
issued three tentative opinions fixing identical temporary rates
for the period after January 1, 1946 for all three American Flag
carriers flying the North Atlantic. 42 These temporary rates con136. North Atlantic Rate case, Docket No. 855 (June 1, 1945). This case
was decided before the end of the Pacific war, but the rate problems did not
arise until after the end of the war.
137. South Atlantic Route case, Docket No. 1171 (August 13, 1946).
138. Pacific Route case, Docket No. 547 (June 20, 1946).
139. Latin American Route case, Docket No. 525 (May 17, 1946).
140. Essair, Inc., Temporary Mail Rate, Docket No. 2002 (March 22, 1946).
141. Ibid.
142. American Overseas Airlines Inc. Mail Rate, Docket No. 1666; Pan
American Airways, Inc., Transatlantic Services, Docket No. 1706; Pan American Airways Inc. Mail Rate for Transpacific Services, Docket No. 2147;
Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Mail Rate for Transatlantic Services,
Docket No. 2375.
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stitute the latest step in the development of the Board's technique
for fixing mail rates.
As far as the trunk-line domestic carriers are concerned, the
development provisions of Section 406 have pretty well done their
job. It is, of course, reasonable to anticipate that after the transitional post war period and with the introduction of more efficient
equipment and an expansion in operating volume further reductions in the forty-five cents per ton mile airmail rate will
bL possible. But the major emphasis will unquestionably be on
new and simpler techniques of fixing domestic rates. The fixing
of identical rates for the Big Four carriers and identical temporary rates for the North Atlantic carriers indicates a further
trend towards group rates applicable to classes of carriers.
The major mail rate problem facing the Board is the development of rate techniques to determine the proper amount
of airmail compensation to be paid feeder carriers and international carriers. In both cases the temporary rates now fixed
by the Board are obvious makeshifts. In both cases the need
for governmental support through mail payments is apparent.
In granting certificates to the feeder carriers the Board established safeguards clearly designed to limit the amount of governmental support by (1) authorizing the operations on a temporary
three year basis and (2) confining authorizations to operations
which would show "a justifiable expectation of success at a
reasonable cost to the government. 1 43 The obvious need is for
a mail rate technique which will keep the government expense
of developing local feeder services at a minimum and at the
same time give the carriers every incentive to develop their
commercial revenues. These problems are basically similar to
those faced by the Board in the early mail rate cases when the
industry as a whole was almost as undeveloped as the local
feeder services are at the present time. It is likely, therefore,
that the early techniques designed to build a self sufficient industry will have a new importance. The Board has indicated
however, that the costs of these carriers must be rigidly controlled, and that the Board expects feeder carriers to exercise
considerable managerial ingenuity to keep costs, particularly
44
ground costs, at a minimum.
143. Investigation of Local Feeder and Pick-up Air Services 6 C.A.B. 1
(July 11, 1944).
144. Rocky Mountain Case, Docket No. 452 decided March 28, 1946.
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The second big field for airmail payments in the future will
be in international aviation. A large part of the development of
new international routes by American Flag carriers will continue to be underwritten by the payment of substantial amounts
of airmail compensation. While the development of a relatively
high volume of traffic to South America, 14 5 and over the North
Atlantic to Europe 4 " may result in elimination of such payment
for these routes, there is every indication that other international
routes, particularly the Pacific and Africa routes, will require
some developmental payments for a substantial period of time.
Here again, the emphasis will be on cost controls and techniques
designed to hasten the attainment of a self-sufficient status.

IV
POLICY FOR THE FUTURE

The air transportation industry has now passed the weaning
stage. Techniques of rate regulation which were applicable to
the industry in its infancy may no longer be appropriate. A good
example of the need of new techniques is found in the growing
necessity of integrating mail rate policy with passenger and property rate policy. Previously mail rates have been set almost independently of passenger and property rates.'47 The need for correlation between these rates is obvious and in a mature industry
it is manifestly impossible to set a mail rate without considering
the effect of that rate on passenger and property rates. For example, if the big carriers are going to have a mail rate set at a
minimum service rate a margin of mail revenue will not be avail145. A show cause order is now pending reducing the rates of Pan American Inc. on its Latin American Division to a compensatory basis. (Show
Cause Order dated May 22, 1945, in Docket No. 1593).
146. There will be a tendency to eliminate any subsidy payments in
North Atlantic operations not only because a high volume of traiffc may
permit it but because of American policy objections to competing with
foreign airlines which are directly subsidized by their governments. The
desire to eliminate those subsidies by foreign governments to their carriers
can only be effectuated If the United States is willing to eliminate its subsidy to American Flag Carriers flying the North Atlantic.
147. In fixing mail rates, the relation of those rates to the possibility of
lowering passenger and property rates has been a subterranean consideration. Passenger and property revenues are of course considered in measuring
the need for airmail compensation. In the show cause orders in the Big
Four cases, a property rate investigation was ordered simultaneously with
the order reducing mail rates, but this investigation has since become inactive. At the time of the final decision in these cases, the carriers lowered
their passenger rates to be relatively consistent with airmail rates on a ton
mile basis. The consideration, however, has been haphazard and the Board
has never ordered a comprehensive investigation of all rates, passenger,
property and mail.
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able to experiment with lowering passenger and property rates
and thus promote and develop a volume of traffic which may
ultimately pave the way for a lowering of all rates. The present
indications are that the Board is aware of the necessity for a
margin above a bare minimum service rate. But there has been
no comprehensive study by the Board of the interrelation between
all rates, and no definite policy has been established of how mail
rates may be used to aid in the development of a volume of
property and passenger traffic. It is believed that such an investigation and the establishment of a policy which articulates
the correlation between all rates is a necessity in-fixing air transportation rates in the future period.
Equally pressing are the problems arising out of the increase
in air transportation of property. During the war there were so
few planes available that the amount of property which could be
carried was severely limited. Most of the property was carried
by air express under agreements by Railway Express with the
air lines. As late as June 30, 1945, only one carrier had filed
freight tariffs with the Board. By September, 1946, however,
twelve carriers had filed freight tariffs. As it becomes increasingly possible for commercial shippers to ship their products by
air, the importance of the property rate structure will increase.
The problems arising out of the expansion of the air transportation of property have been complicated by the development of
non-scheduled operations during this same period. Since it takes
between one and two years to obtain a certificate of convenience
and necessity to operate a scheduled airline and since chances
of a new applicant are woefully slim, those wishing to enter the
airline business today have for the most part established nonscheduled operations which do not require a certificate. Nonscheduled carriers have been particularly active in the cargo field
which the established airlines had neglected. The tendency of
non-scheduled operations to expand has been accelerated in the
past months by the increasing availability of surplus planes and
by the return to civilian life of veterans trained in flying airplanes
and anxious to continue flying them. Non-scheduled operations
are no longer insignificant. Well financed, competently managed
carriers handling a substantial payload are beginning to operate.
Unquestionably a lot of non-scheduled operations are founded
more on hope than fact and the post war era will see a lot of
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capital lost. The trend on the whole, however, is an expanding
one-particularly in the cargo field.
There are already indications of a cut rate war involving
property charges which may hurt the orderly development of air
transportation in this country. The fares charged by some nonscheduled operators bear no relation to the cost of operations.
On the other hand, some scheduled airlines have filed tariffs providing for property charges of approximately eleven cents a ton
mile in plane load lots while insisting that forty-five cents per ton
mile is the minimum for which mail can be carried. It may be
that the eleven cents per ton mile rate is justified on a promotional basis or that the difference in the handling costs of mail
may warrant the differential in charges. But there is also the
possibility that this rate is below cost and designed primarily to
drive smaller competitors out of business. Unquestionably competition between and among scheduled and nonscheduled operators has had a healthy effect on forcing down rates. But the history of motor carrier transportation in this country indicates the
substantial dangers of cut rate competition. The sickening spectacle in the 1930's of cut rate competition in motor transportation
leading to a succession of business failures should not be repeated
in the air transportation field. In addition to the amount of the
charges, the tariffs that are filed often contain provisions, such
as provisions limiting liability in the case of loss, which are of
dubious propriety.
Up to the present time, the experience of the Board with
property carriage has been so slight that a general investigation
of charges and conditions of carriage of property would have had
frugal results.148 But the rapid post war growth of property trans-

portation, by both scheduled and non-scheduled carriers, has provided a background of experience which makes an active investigation not only possible but highly desirable. The Civil Aeronautics Act provides for the fixing of maximum and minimum
property rates for both scheduled and non-scheduled common
carriers in domestic air transportation. The purpose of this provision was to provide for the orderly development of rate levels.
To date the Board has not directly exercised its authority to fix
148. As pointed out supra, on December 22, 1944, the Board concurrently
with the issuance of orders to show cause in the Big Four rate cases ordered
an investigation into the rates, fares, and charges for the transportation of
property by domestic air carriers. This investigation, however, is dormant.
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maximum or minimum property-rates though tariffs of scheduled
operators must be filed with the Board. The purpose of the property rate provision will be frustrated unless the charges for the
transportation of property by both scheduled and non-scheduled
operators are brought under control. The problem is not simple
if full advantage is to be taken of the healthy effect of competition on rates. But with the advent of property transportation as
big air transport business, there can be no question that rate regulation in that field is on the agenda for the near future.
The determination of rate policy for the future will also involve fundamental decisions relating to the control of international rates. The present approval of IATA as an instrument of
control of such rates will continue only through February 1947.
At the end of that time the question of continuing the rate conference procedure of IATA will again be to the fore. If administrative control of international air rates of United States carriers
is not conferred upon a federal agency by Congress during the interval, the question of continuing such procedure will be pressing. Either the rate conference procedure will have to continue
or an alternative method of control must be sought. Even if power
is granted by Congress to a federal administrative body to regulate international rates, the very fact that the rate conference
procedure has been in existence for a year will pose obstacles in
the way of its removal. In either event, it would seem logical to
lodge the control of rates for international air operations in an
international body organized to deal with international aviation.
We already have at hand such an organization in PICAO and its
probably permanent successor body. 1'49
The argument can be made that rate policy under PICAO
will be governed by national policy considerations of the majority
of members who have traditionally favored high rates and limited
frequency of operation. These national policy considerations will
exist whether or not PICAO is used as an agency for settling
differences. The question of international rates is an international
issue, which should be dealt with upon a broad basis. Unilateral
or even bilateral control can only-mean a process of determination
upon a narrow basis which will take into account only the re149. When 26 states have adhered to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, PICAO will become a permanent body. The Congress
of the United States in July, 1946, ratified the permanent Convention setting
up such. a body thus establishing American adherence.
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quirements of the particular parties. The United States government has unreservedly given its support and largely placed its
faith in the future of the United Nations. That organization can
succeed in the long run only if the myriad problems arising within various areas of economic conflict are settled upon an international basis. There can be no whole peace while conflicts exist
in the parts that go to make up the whole. One of the points of
international friction is the field of aviation where varying economic philosophies and differing national needs combine to produce disagreement. Control of rates is the basic problem within
this area of conflict. It can and should be dealt with by an international body as a part of the framework of peace. 150
150. During July, 1946, the United States formally took steps to abandon
the principle of multi-lateral air transport agreements inaugurated by the
Air Transport Agreement drafted at the Chicago Conference in December,
1944. This was the so-called "Five Freedoms" agreement. This action formally ended a procedure which had been dead in fact for some time. The
failure of these multi-lateral agreements further accentuates the necessity of
finding an international solution to rate control upon some basis other than
the narrow bargaining of bi-lateral negotiations.

